Canadian Government BSE Coverup?

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Oldtimer

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Too bad the US ranchers can't get their case against USDA into court to find out the full truth of what both USDA and CFIA know-- and may have hid or poo-pooed away...Looks like the Canuck atttorney is making a good case for the US cattle industry to go after the Canadian Government for allowing BSE to circulate unfettered thruout Canada for 10 years and fester into the epidemic state it may now be- all the while knowingly shipping the possible diseased product to the US....

---------------------------------------------------------

What did they know and when did they know it?

Canadian attorneys discover B.S.E. was in Canada 10 years before government admitted it.




(MEATPOULTRY.com, June 29, 2007)

by Steve Bjerklie



A case now moving through the Canadian courts casts into serious doubt whether the Canadian government was forthright and transparent in its management of the risk to Canadian cattlemen from bovine spongiform encephalopathy. The issue speaks to the frustration of cattlemen and beef processors on both sides of the border, some of whom believe government mismanagement of B.S.E. in North America led to hasty decisions in 2003 that nearly destroyed the cattle industry in much of Canada and northern-tier states in the U.S.



Already, plaintiffs' counsel has uncovered the fact that the first confirmed B.S.E.-infected cow in Canada was documented in 1993 – a decade before the Canadian Food Inspection Agency went public with an announcement that a B.S.E.-infected cow had been found in Alberta in May 2003. Just as troubling, C.F.I.A. was charged with tracking and maintaining surveillance of 198 cattle imported from the United Kingdom in the 1980s – and it lost track of 80 of them.


The first confirmed B.S.E. case in the U.S. was announced by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service in late December 2003. The infected animal was found in Washington state; it had been born in Alberta, Canada. The fallout, however, closed dozens of beef export markets for both Canada and the U.S. The ramifications of those closures remain in continuing negotiations with Japan and South Korea to fully reopen their markets to North American product.



"We have a number of allegations that the government didn't act in a prudent way to prevent risk to Canadian cattlemen," commented Gilles Gareau, a lead attorney in the case, to MEAT&POULTRY. "They never told anyone about the first B.S.E. case, for example."



The case comprises four separate class-action suits by Canadian cattlemen against the Canadian government, one each in Quebec, Alberta and Saskatchewan, and one in Ontario covering the other provinces and territories. Earlier this month, Quebec Superior Court certified the suit in that province, which means, said Gareau, "it's not 'appealable' by the government." The suit was filed on behalf of 20,000 cattle producers in Quebec, and it, in conjunction with the other class-action filings, seeks C$9 billion in payment to Canadian cattle producers for lost income, diminution of the value of business and loss of property value. The Ontario portion of the case also moved forward earlier this month when the Ontario Court of Appeals refused to strike down two negligence claims against the government brought by Bill Sauer, a producer who raises cattle near Niagara Falls, Ont.



Cameron Pallet, counsel for the Ontario class action, told M&P he found a reference to the 1993 B.S.E. animal in a footnote buried in a 1994 report written for the government by a risk analysis expert that was never released to the public. "The really bad part is when they realized they had this B.S.E. case, they didn't do anything." Moreover, in 1994 the Canadian government had negotiated a "one cow and you're out" agreement with the United States, meaning that if a single B.S.E. case was discovered in either country, the border would close. "They guaranteed that their negligence would kill the Canadian cattle industry," said Pallet.



The attorney is just as angry about the missing 80 cattle. Agriculture Canada agreed to monitor the whereabouts of all British cattle imported into Canada since 1982, a group of 198 animals. (In 1990, the Canadian government banned the import of British cattle in response to the growing B.S.E. crisis.) "If they were supposed to be monitoring these animals, what the hell were they doing? How can you lose track of 40 percent of what you're supposed to be following?" He was able to learn that 68 of the missing cattle had been routinely slaughtered for food, and 12 were rendered into feed.


"If you look at this statistically, of those 198 cattle, there was a 95-percent chance that at least six of them were B.S.E.-infected," notes Gareau, who adds there's documentation that Agriculture Canada communicated with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration when the first Canadian B.S.E. case was found in 1993, but the border was not closed and cattle trade remained open between the two countries. "They used the excuse of an integrated market," he said. "And what happened later was the floor fell out from under the cattle industry."



Gareau said he wants to go to back to court for liability damages as soon as possible, but said it would be a year, perhaps two, before the case is brought to trial.



Theresa Keddy, spokeswoman for the Canadian Cattlemen's Association, said her organization won't be part of the litigation. "We're looking forward," she commented to M&P.



meatpoultry.com
 
Oldtimer":3q8x6p86 said:
Too bad the US ranchers can't get their case against USDA into court to find out the full truth of what both USDA and CFIA know-- and may have hid or poo-pooed away...Looks like the Canuck atttorney is making a good case for the US cattle industry to go after the Canadian Government for allowing BSE to circulate unfettered thruout Canada for 10 years and fester into the epidemic state it may now be- all the while knowingly shipping the possible diseased product to the US....

---------------------------------------------------------

What did they know and when did they know it?

Canadian attorneys discover B.S.E. was in Canada 10 years before government admitted it.




(MEATPOULTRY.com, June 29, 2007)

by Steve Bjerklie



A case now moving through the Canadian courts casts into serious doubt whether the Canadian government was forthright and transparent in its management of the risk to Canadian cattlemen from bovine spongiform encephalopathy. The issue speaks to the frustration of cattlemen and beef processors on both sides of the border, some of whom believe government mismanagement of B.S.E. in North America led to hasty decisions in 2003 that nearly destroyed the cattle industry in much of Canada and northern-tier states in the U.S.



Already, plaintiffs' counsel has uncovered the fact that the first confirmed B.S.E.-infected cow in Canada was documented in 1993 – a decade before the Canadian Food Inspection Agency went public with an announcement that a B.S.E.-infected cow had been found in Alberta in May 2003. Just as troubling, C.F.I.A. was charged with tracking and maintaining surveillance of 198 cattle imported from the United Kingdom in the 1980s – and it lost track of 80 of them.


The first confirmed B.S.E. case in the U.S. was announced by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service in late December 2003. The infected animal was found in Washington state; it had been born in Alberta, Canada. The fallout, however, closed dozens of beef export markets for both Canada and the U.S. The ramifications of those closures remain in continuing negotiations with Japan and South Korea to fully reopen their markets to North American product.



"We have a number of allegations that the government didn't act in a prudent way to prevent risk to Canadian cattlemen," commented Gilles Gareau, a lead attorney in the case, to MEAT&POULTRY. "They never told anyone about the first B.S.E. case, for example."

Coverup.. :roll: :roll: :lol: That is absolute Bullshitt Ot it was all over Canadian news channels.. that a imported U.k cow was found with b.s.e six yrs after she entered the country.In fact there was a huge fight by that producer to spare the rest of his herd from being destroyed.

I quess them lawyers were too busy to watch the news.








Oldtimer":3q8x6p86 said:
[The attorney is just as angry about the missing 80 cattle. Agriculture Canada agreed to monitor the whereabouts of all British cattle imported into Canada since 1982, a group of 198 animals. (In 1990, the Canadian government banned the import of British cattle in response to the growing B.S.E. crisis.) "If they were supposed to be monitoring these animals, what the be nice were they doing? How can you lose track of 40 percent of what you're supposed to be following?" He was able to learn that 68 of the missing cattle had been routinely slaughtered for food, and 12 were rendered into feed.
Pretty hard to track cows that don,t exist by the time you start monitoring...pretty much shows the need for mandatory I.D
 
frenchie--I take it you aren't one of the 20,000 ranchers suing in the class action suit- nor a perceived recipient of some of the $9 Billion-Eh ? ;-) :lol:

." Moreover, in 1994 the Canadian government had negotiated a "one cow and you're out" agreement with the United States, meaning that if a single B.S.E. case was discovered in either country, the border would close. "They guaranteed that their negligence would kill the Canadian cattle industry," said Pallet.

Where you aware that the BSE border policy was "negotiated" between the countries way back in 94---so besides the USDA's (pre-BSE) long studied rule in which the TSE experts and committee recommended closing the border as our best defense-- now the Canadian ranchers attorney said their was a negotiated agreement that felt the disease was so serious that the border should be closed....

I would still like all the evidence hit the courtroom floor- from both countries on all the flip flops and foul ups-and what they actually knew and did, and when---- and how some of these recent multinational packer backed changes came about (and are they backed by true science)....

I think the stink and stench of both governments actions could make the courtroom a very uncomfortable place....
 
Oldtimer":2ec1qaw5 said:
frenchie--I take it you aren't one of the 20,000 ranchers suing in the class action suit- nor a perceived recipient of some of the $9 Billion-Eh ? ;-) :lol:

....

nope ...No use for lawyers ..only good ones are dead ones.Just like some judges :lol:
 
Oldtimer":bs587gsd said:
Too bad the US ranchers can't get their case against USDA into court to find out the full truth of what both USDA and CFIA know-- and may have hid or poo-pooed away...Looks like the Canuck atttorney is making a good case for the US cattle industry to go after the Canadian Government for allowing BSE to circulate unfettered thruout Canada for 10 years and fester into the epidemic state it may now be- all the while knowingly shipping the possible diseased product to the US....

---------------------------------------------------------

What did they know and when did they know it?



GOOD question Oldtimer, but who's covering up what, and where i.e. USDA et al ;


NOW OT, lets crunch some numbers, and list all the figures. remember, the UK was not the only BSE country we imported from ;



UK Exports of Live Cattle by Value 1986-96

USA 697 LIVE CATTLE

CANADA 299 LIVE CATTLE

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11f/tab11.pdf




A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk
countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some
imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90's when
domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of
the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from
BSE risk countries.
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed
that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as
there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very
unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the
BSE-agent persistently increases.


snip...


Conclusions
The European Food Safety Authority concludes:
1. The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic
cattle in the middle of the eighties. This cattle imported in the mid eighties could have
been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early
nineties. It is possible that meat and bone meal (MBM) imported into the USA
reached domestic cattle and lead to an internal challenge in the early nineties.
2. A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE
risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together
with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the
mid 90's when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing.
Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued
imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.
3. The current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed
that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent.
4. This assessment deviates from the previous assessment (SSC opinion, 2000) because
at that time several exporting countries were not considered a potential risk.
5. It is also worth noting that the current GBR conclusions are not dependent on the large
exchange of imports between USA and Canada. External challenge due to exports to
the USA from European countries varied from moderate to high. These challenges
indicate that it was likely that BSE infectivity was introduced into the North American
continent.
6. EFSA and its Scientific Expert Working group on GBR are concerned that the
available information was not confirmed by inspection missions as performed by the
Food and Veterinary office (FVO – DG SANCO) in Member States and other third
countries. They recommend including, as far as feasible, BSE-related aspects in
future inspection missions.

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/etc/medialib/ ... v2_en1.pdf



2. EXTERNAL CHALLENGES

2.1 Import of cattle from BSE-Risk2 countries

An overview of the data on live cattle imports is presented in table 1 and is based on

data as provided in the country dossier (CD) and corresponding data on relevant exports

as available from BSE risk countries that exported to Canada. Only data from risk

periods are indicated, i.e. those periods when exports from a BSE risk country already

represented an external challenge, according to the SSC opinion on the GBR (SSC July

2000 and updated January 2002).

• According to the CD, 231 cattle were imported from UK during the years 1980 to

1990 and no cattle imports from UK were recorded after 1990.

• According to Eurostat, altogether 198 cattle have been imported from the UK during

the years 1980 to 1990, Additionally 500 were recorded in 1993; this import is

1 For the purpose of the GBR assessment the abbreviation "MBM" refers to rendering products, in particular

the commodities Meat and Bone Meal as such; Meat Meal; Bone Meal; and Greaves. With regard to imports

it refers to the customs code 230110 "flours, meals and pellets, made from meat or offal, not fit for human

2 BSE-Risk countries are all countries already assessed as GBR III or IV or with at least one confirmed

Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 2, 1-14 on the Assessment of the

Geographical BSE Risk of Canada

- 3 -

mentioned in Eurostat and the updated UK export statistic as male calves, but not

mentioned in the original UK export statistics. According to the CD, detailed

investigations were carried out and it is very unlikely that the 500 calves have been

imported. Therefore, they were not taken into account.

• According to the CD, in 1990 all cattle imported from UK and Ireland since 1982

were placed in a monitoring program.

• Following the occurrence of the BSE index case in 1993 (imported from UK in 1987

at the age of 6 months), an attempt was made to trace all other cattle imported from

UK between 1982 and 1990.

• Of the 231 cattle imported from the UK between 1980 and 1990, 108 animals had

been slaughtered and 9 had died. From the remaining, 37 were exported, 76 were

sent to incineration and one was buried; these were not entering the rendering system

and therefore not taken into account.

• According to the CD, 16 cattle were imported from Ireland (according to Eurostat

20), of which 9 were slaughtered, 3 died. The remaining 4 were incinerated and did

therefore not enter the rendering system. According to the CD, the 6 animals which

were imported in 1990 according to Eurostat, were never imported.

• Moreover 22 cattle have been imported from Japan (through USA), of which 4 were

exported (excluded from the table) and 14 were destroyed and therefore not entering

the rendering system, 4 were slaughtered.

• Of 28 imported bovines from Denmark, 1 was destroyed and 1 was exported. Of the

19 buffalos imported in 2000, 1 was incinerated and the others were ordered to be

destroyed.

• Additionally in total 264 cattle according to the CD (276 according to other sources)

were imported from Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, The Netherlands and

Switzerland.

• The numbers imported according to the CD and Eurostat are very similar. Some

discrepancies in the year of import can be explained by an extended quarantine;

therefore it is likely that imports according to Eurostat in 1980 and imports

according to the CD in 1981 are referring to the same animals.

• Additionally, between 16.000 and 340.000 bovines have annually been imported

from US, almost all are steers and heifers. In total, between 1981 and 2003,

according to the CD more than 2.3 million, according to other sources 1.5 million

cattle have been imported.

• According to the CD, feeder/slaughter cattle represent typically more than 90% of

the imported cattle from the USA; therefore, only 10% of the imported cattle have

been taken into account.


snip...


Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 2, 1-15 on the Assessment of the

Geographical BSE Risk of Canada

2.2 Import of MBM or MBM-containing feedstuffs from BSE-Risk

countries

An overview of the data on MBM imports is presented in table 2 and is based on data

provided in the country dossier (CD) and corresponding data on relevant exports as

available from BSE risk countries that exported to Canada. Only data from risk periods

are indicated, i.e. those periods when exports from a BSE risk country already

represented an external challenge, according to the SSC opinion on the GBR (SSC, July

2000 and updated January 2002).

According to the CD, no imports of MBM took place from UK since 1978 (initially

because of FMD regulations).

• According to Eurostat data, Canada imported 149 tons MBM from the UK in the

period of 1993 to 2001. According to up-dated MBM statistics from UK (August

2001) no mammalian MBM was exported to Canada from 1993 – 1996. As it was

illegal to export mammalian meat meal, bone meal and MBM from UK since

27/03/1996, exports indicated after that date should only have included nonmammalian

MBM. Therefore, these imports were not taken into account.

• According to the CD, imports of MBM have taken place from Denmark, Germany,

France, Japan and US.

• According to Eurostat Canada imported MBM from Denmark, Belgium, France and

Ireland.

• According to the CD further investigations concluded that all imported MBM from

Denmark consisted of pork and poultry origin and was directly imported for

aquaculture, the imported MBM from France was feather meal, the imported MBM

from Germany was poultry meal for aquaculture and the imported MBM from

Belgium was haemoglobin; therefore these imports were not taken into account.

• The main imports of MBM were of US origin, according to the CD around 250.000

tons, according to other sources around 310.000 tons between 1988 and 2003.


snip...


2.3 Overall assessment of the external challenge

The level of the external challenge that has to be met by the BSE/cattle system is

estimated according to the guidance given by the SSC in its final opinion on the GBR of

July 2000 (as updated in January 2002).

Live cattle imports:

In total the country imported according to the CD more than 2.3 million, according to

other data 1.5 million live cattle from BSE risk countries, of which 231 (CD)

respectively 698 (other sources) came from the UK. The numbers shown in table 1 are

the raw import figures and are not reflecting the adjusted imports for the assessment of

the external challenge. Broken down to 5 year periods the resulting external challenge is

as given in table 3. This assessment takes into account the different aspects discussed

above that allow to assume that certain imported cattle did not enter the domestic

BSE/cattle system, i.e. were not rendered into feed. In the case of Canada, the 500 cattle

imported from UK according to Eurostat were not taken into account and it is assumed

that all incinerated, buried, exported animals and the animals still alive did not enter the

rendering system and were therefore excluded from the external challenge.

MBM imports:

In total the country imported according to the CD around 300.000 tons, according to

other sources nearly 360.000 tons of MBM from BSE risk countries, of which 149 tons

came from the UK. The majority consisted of MBM imported from the US. The

numbers shown in table 2 are the raw import figures and are not reflecting the adjusted

imports for the assessment of the external challenge. Broken down to 5 year periods the

resulting external challenge is as given in table 3. This assessment takes into account

the different aspects discussed above that allow to assume that certain imported MBM

did not enter the domestic BSE/cattle system or did not represent an external challenge

for other reasons. As it was illegal to export mammalian meat meal, bone meal and

MBM from UK since 27/03/1996, exports indicated after that date should only have

included non-mammalian MBM. In the case of Canada all imported MBM from UK,

Germany, Belgium, Denmark and France was not taken into account.


snip...

full text;



http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/efsa_sci ... ex_en1.pdf



oddly enough, this is not accessable for USA figures ;

Annex
Details of the assessment are presented in the report as prepared by the EFSA Scientific
Expert Working Group on GBR:
http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/efsa_sci ... 74_en.html

The page cannot be found

LETs dig a bit further there OT ;


3. CHALLENGES
3.1 External challenge resulting from importing BSE-infectivity
3.11 Factor 2: Import of live cattle
• Between 1980 and 1989, 496 cattle (96 % breeding animals, 4% dairy cattle)
were imported from the UK (324) and the Republic of Ireland (162) and
between 1983 and 87 397 breeding cattle were imported from Switzerland,
France, Germany, Austria, Belgium and Italy.
• Of the UK-imports 266 cattle were imported before 1988. They represented a
moderate challenge, as did the 47 directly imported in 1988/89 and the 10
imported via Canada in 1990-93.
Country 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 Total
UK 1 23 21 87 48 28 58 25 22 6* 3* 1* 334
Ireland 70 21 62 9 162
EU 5 187 73 29 294
CH 45 41 17 103
Table 1: Cattle imports from UK, IRE EU and CH between 1980 and 1989, UKimports
after 1989 via CAN.
• In addition, between 0.75 Million (1986) and 2.5 Million (1995) cattle per year
have been imported to the USA mainly from Canada and Mexico, either for
feeding or for immediate slaughter. These animals were considered to have
posed a negligible challenge.
• The large majority of the Irish cattle (153) were imported before 1985. Even if
the first Irish birth cohort with a BSE-case was 1981 they are regarded as a
negligible challenge to the US system.
• The imports from other EU countries and Switzerland that happened before
1988 also present only a negligible challenge, as do the 40 breeding cattle from


Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of the USA July 2000
- 41 -
Belgium, Germany, Austria and Italy in 1996 and 1997. However, the latter
were all identified and will be taken out of the food and feed production chain.
• The moderate challenge resulting from the importation of cattle from the UK
was reduced due to the trace-back and elimination of the imported animals.
Analysis of the data on these traced animals indicates that no more than 126
animals imported from the UK could have presented a challenge to the system
with only 15 of these animals imported during 88-93. This total was calculated
by the US-authorities, starting with the total number of animals imported from
the UK between 1980 and 1989. From this total those animals that were known
to have been incinerated or buried were subtracted. From the remaining
animals those that were known to have reached the age of 6 years or older prior
to death or slaughter have been subtracted because they were seen to present
only a reduced risk for BSE – if infected prior to import they would probably
have shown clinical symptoms of BSE.
• Fifty-two of the 117 animals known to be alive in 1995 came from herds in the
UK in which one or more cases of BSE subsequently developed. In 1999, 4 of
these 117 animals were still alive. 113 had been purchased, diagnostic samples
taken, and the carcasses were incinerated. All these animals tested negative for
BSE (histopathology and IHC).
3.12 Factor 3: Import of MBM or feed containing MBM
• No import of MBM from Europe occurred between 1990 and 1998, and the
country experts, although not able to provide exact data, claimed that import
practices for MBM had not changed since 1980.
• However, the UK export statistics mention 12 tons of mammalian meals and
flours,29 in 1981, 10 tons in 84, 2 tons in 85, 20 tons in 89, and 37 tons in 97
being exported to the USA. However, the import of 20 tons in 89 is questioned
by the USA Authorities.
• A realistic assumption is, therefore, that the external challenge through MBM
imports was negligible.
3.2 Internal challenge resulting from domestic infected animals
3.21 Interaction of external challenges and stability
• In the 80s an extremely unstable system was exposed to a moderate challenge
resulting from cattle imports mainly from the UK.
• If this external challenge lead to BSE-infectivity entering the feed chain in the
USA, domestic cattle would have been exposed to it and the incoming BSEinfectivity
would have been amplified and the disease propagated. Domestic
cases would appear about one incubation period after the infected import-cattle
were slaughtered and infected MBM would have entered the feed chain and
could have reached domestic cattle.
• Cattle imported from the UK in 1988/89 carried the highest risk of being
infected with BSE. Some of these could have entered the feed chain prior 1990,
while being infected. The highest probability for domestic cases resulting
29 UK Overseas Trade Statistics are not available specifically for MBM. MBM is included under the
heading "Flours and meals of meat or offal (including tankage), unfit for human consumption;
greaves". Since the adoption of Commission Decision 96/239/EC on 27/03/96 it has been illegal to
export from the UK meat meal, bonemeal, and MBM derived from mammals. The exports shown for
1996 and 1997 may have included non-mammalian MBM.
Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of the USA July 2000
- 42 -
directly from this challenge to appear as clinical BSE-cases would therefore be
between 1995 (90+5) and, as a "second generation" 2000 (95+5).
• Between 1990 and 1995, with the exclusion of the imported animals from
Europe from the feed chain, the impact of the external challenge was largely
mastered. The external challenge is therefore considered low after 1990.
• Given the relative small number of potentially infected cattle that were
rendered and the negligible size of the potential MBM import, the total number
of domestic cases is likely to remain small.
• However, even the small number of theoretically possible domestic cases
would since 1993 expose the (very) unstable (prior to 1998) or neutrally stable
(since 1998) system to an internal challenge and circulating BSE-infectivity
would have been amplified until 1998. Recycling is still possible.


snip...


4. CONCLUSION ON THE RESULTING RISKS
4.1 Interaction of stability and challenge
• In the late 80s, early 90s a moderate external challenges met an extremely or
very unstable system. This would have quickly amplified any incoming BSEinfectivity
and propagated the disease.
• With the exclusion of imported animals from Europe from the feed chain
between 1990 and 1995 the effect of the external challenge decreased but
during this period the system was still very unstable.
Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of the USA July 2000
- 43 -
• It cannot be excluded that the initial external challenges lead to some domestic
infected animals. If this happened an internal challenge started to build-up in
the early 90s. It grew slowly and kept the overall challenge at low levels even
after the impact of external challenge ceased at the latest in 1995.
Overall Challenge

snip...full text ;


http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out137_en.pdf



3. CHALLENGES
• Before 1987 a "very low" and from 1988 to 1990 a "low" external challenge is
assumed. It resulted from a very small number of UK-imported cattle (11 that
carried a risk of being infected) that entered processing. Other external
challenges, due to import of live cattle or MBM from other countries affected
by BSE, were regarded as insignificant but still not non-negligible.
Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of CANADA July 2000
- 32 -
• It is unlikely, but cannot be excluded, that some BSE entered the Canadian feed
chain and resulted in a (small) internal challenge.
• The overall challenge was therefore first determined by the very low and low
external challenges. As a reasonable worst case scenario it is assumed that the
(unlikely) internal challenge, which could have resulted from the interaction of
the insufficient stability and the external challenges, was just enough to
maintain a low level of the overall challenge, even after the external challenges
practically ceased in 1993.
4. CONCLUSION ON THE RESULTING RISKS
4.1 Interaction of stability and challenges
• From 1980 to 1992 the extremely unstable system was exposed to "very low"
(prior to 1988) and to "low" external challenges (1988-1992).
• The development of an internal challenge is unlikely but cannot be excluded
because the extremely unstable system would most probably have recycled and
amplified incoming BSE-infectivity.
• If at all an internal challenge would have started to develop around 1990 and,
in that case, could have at least partly compensated the declining external
challenges that were significantly reduced/stopped with the exclusion of all
imported cattle from processing in 1993. As a reasonable worst case scenario it
is assumed that this kept the overall challenge at a constant, low level, after
1993.
• After 1992 the stability of the system increased through implementation of a
good passive surveillance system and the traceback and removal of imported
cattle. The system became "unstable" in 1994 and "neutrally stable" after 1997.
It could hence cope better with the low overall challenge that is assumed to
have been present.
• Given the fact that the system is still not seen to be able to reduce circulating
BSE-infectivity, it is unlikely but cannot be excluded that a low (internal)
challenge is maintained.


http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out131_en.pdf


NOW when and where was that first case of BSE detected $$$


It is clear that USDA have little information and _no_ regulatory
responsibility for rendering plants in the US...

snip...

3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach
was to accord it a _very low profile indeed_. Dr. A Thiermann showed
the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought
this was a fanatical incident to be _avoided_ in the US _at all costs_...

snip...

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf


DISCUSSION
These findings suggest that TME may result from feeding mink infected cattle and
we have alerted bovine practitioners that there may exist an as yet unrecognized
scrapie-like disease of cattle in the United States (Marsh and Hartsough, 1986). A new
bovine spongiform encephalopathy has recently been reported in England (Wells et al.,
1987), and investigators are presently studying its transmissibility and possible
relationship to scrapie. Because this new bovine disease in England is characterized by
behavioral changes, hyperexcitability, and agressiveness, it is very likely it would be
confused with rabies in the United Stales and not be diagnosed. Presently, brains from
cattle in the United States which are suspected of rabies infection are only tested with
anti-rabies virus antibody and are not examined histopathologically for lesions of
spongiform encephalopathy.


http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf



TSS
 
Great now we all know BSE came over from europe. Thanks for the history lesson lets get on with eliminating it. Not start pointing fingers again.
 

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